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Abstract—Unsafe websites consist of malicious as well as
inappropriate sites, such as those hosting questionable or offensive
content. Website reputation systems are intended to help ordinary
users steer away from these unsafe sites. However, the process of
assigning safety ratings for websites typically involves humans.
Consequently it is time consuming, costly and not scalable. This
has resulted in two major problems: (i) a significant proportion of
the web space remains unrated and (ii) there is an unacceptable
time lag before new websites are rated.
In this paper, we show that by leveraging structural and
content-based properties of websites, it is possible to reliably and
efficiently predict their safety ratings, thereby mitigating both
problems. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach using
four datasets of up to 90,000 websites. We use ratings from Web
of Trust (WOT), a popular crowdsourced web reputation system,
as ground truth. We propose a novel ensemble classification
technique that makes opportunistic use of available structural and
content properties of webpages to predict their eventual ratings in
two dimensions used by WOT: trustworthiness and child safety.
Ours is the first classification system to predict such subjective
ratings and the same approach works equally well in identifying
malicious websites. Across all datasets, our classification performs
well with average F1-score in the 74–90% range.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has revolutionized the way we communicate
today and has already become an integral part of our daily
lives. The immense popularity of the Internet, with an increas-
ing user base of billions, has naturally attracted miscreants.
They set up various types of “unsafe” websites to lure their
victims. These include malicious sites, intended for phishing,
drive-by-downloads of malware etc. as well as sites that
are inappropriate in some sense. Examples include websites
hosting offensive, objectionable, hateful or illegal content, and
misusing private user data.
A variety of mechanisms have been developed for steer-
ing unsuspecting users away from unsafe websites. Popular
browsers present interstitial security warnings when users
attempt to navigate to a known malicious website [1]. Several
anti-virus vendors maintain website reputation systems (e.g.,
TrustedSource1. These systems use a combination of machine
learning techniques and manual expert evaluation to arrive
at the rating for a given website. A popular sub-category of
reputation systems are those that make use of input ratings that
are crowdsourced from the users of the system. PhishTank2 and
Web of Trust (WOT)3 are examples of web reputation systems
1http://www.trustedsource.org/
2http://www.phishtank.com/
3https://www.mywot.com/
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Fig. 1. Cumulative availability (%) of WOT reputation ratings along two
dimensions (trustworthiness and child safety) for the one million most popular
webpages as of July 2014 collected from Alexa (http://www.alexa.com). The
plot highlights that often (over 58%) webpages lack reputation ratings in at
least one dimension to indicate their safety.
that rely fully or partly on crowdsourced ratings. An advantage
of crowdsourced ratings is that the ratings can cover a broader
class of unsafe websites, including those that are perceived
to be inappropriate but not outright malicious [10]. Typically
these rating systems are queried by dedicated browser exten-
sions which can signal the result to the user in the form of a
color-coded glyph, e.g., a red glyph indicating an unsafe site
and a green glyph indicating a safe site (see Section III).
All website reputation rating systems, especially those that
involve humans in the rating process, suffer from two major
disadvantages:
• Insufficient coverage: Often the webspace coverage
by a reputation system is limited. This is due to the
high cost and poor scalability of obtaining experts’
ratings, as well as the lack of motivation for users to
participate actively in rating webpages. This problem
is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the availability of
WOT reputation ratings for the one million most pop-
ular webpages. In WOT websites are rated according
to two dimensions, trustworthiness and child safety,
which are both subjective. A majority of the webpages
are unrated: 58% for trustworthiness and 66% for child
safety.
• Time lag: The time gap between a new website coming
online and the system assigning a rating to it can
be long. Often the gap can be in the order of days
to months. This is particularly problematic because
unsafe websites tend to be short-lived, with lifetimes
often in the order of hours or days [27].
A consequence of these drawbacks is that users who rely on
such reputation systems to protect them from unsafe contents
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remain vulnerable when many unsafe websites are unrated.
Regardless of the concerns as to whether such reputation
systems based on crowdsourced ratings are effective [26], the
sheer number of users who rely on such systems (see Section
III) warrants solutions to mitigate this vulnerability.
Rating systems that make use of machine learning tech-
niques, provided that they are fast, can address these short-
comings. Machine learning has already been extensively used
for detecting malicious websites based on the structure and
content of web pages [9], [11], [30]. It is plausible that similar
techniques can also be applied to predicting the future rating
of a website in subjective dimensions as used in systems
like WOT. Thus, our work addresses the following research
question: Can we reliably predict the eventual rating of an
unrated website?
In this paper, we describe LookAhead, the system we built
in the process of investigating this question. LookAhead uses a
combination of structural and content-based features to predict
the eventual rating a website is likely to receive. In reality,
not all feature types can be extracted from all webpages (see
Section IV) and to mitigate this feature unavailability problem
we propose an ensemble classification approach. Accordingly,
we train different classifiers for each feature type and present
different combination strategies to estimate the overall rating.
For the structure of the websites, we consider HTML and
JavaScript-based features. However, we show that structural
features alone would not be sufficient for accurate predictions.
Therefore, we introduce a novel content-based feature set, that
is extracted from the malicious outward links and the text
present on a webpage.
We make the following contributions:
• Content-based features for effectively predicting the
future rating of a website. In particular, we propose
a novel use of the empirical cumulative distribution
function (ECDF) as a feature set to extract clues
about the content of a web page based on ratings of
hyperlinks embedded in it (Section IV-B1). We also
propose how topic modeling techniques can be used to
extract features that capture the theme of a webpage
(Section IV-B2).
• LookAhead: an adaptive ensemble classification
technique effectively combining several classifiers for
structural and content-based feature sets by learning
combination weights from data (Section IV-C).
• Systematic evaluation of LookAhead on several
datasets with up to 90, 000 web pages. (Section V) We
also evaluate the performance of Prophiler [9], which
uses only structural features, on the those datasets.
We show that the performance is significantly (statis-
tically) better than using only the structural features of
web pages, as in Prophiler (Section VI). In particular,
this holds across both subjective dimensions (trustwor-
thiness and child safety), as well as maliciousness.
II. RELATED WORK
A typical approach for helping users avoid malicious web-
sites is to make use of blacklists of known bad websites. For
example, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox
web browsers warn users when they try to visit a page present
on a blacklist. Unfortunately, blacklists suffer from a number
of shortcomings, e.g., blacklists are required to be updated
periodically, are often slow to reflect new malicious websites,
and have poor coverage of malicious webspace. Moreover,
adversaries often try to masquerade malicious webpages as be-
nign by making slight modifications to their URLs. To mitigate
problems with blacklists, Felegyhazi et al. propose a system
that, given an initial blacklist of domains, tries to predict
potentially malicious domains based on nameserver features
and registration information [17]. Prakash et al. propose five
different heuristics that allow synthesizing new URLs from
existing ones. The authors use this idea to enlarge the existing
blacklist of malicious URLs [29].
Going beyond blacklists, application of machine learning
techniques to successfully identify malicious websites has be-
come popular. Ma et al. [23] explore the use of lexical features,
including the length and number of dots in URLs, host-based
features, such as IP address, domain name and other data
returned by WHOIS queries [14] to identify malicious web
links. They evaluated their approach using 20,000 URLs drawn
from different sources, specifically benign URLs are collected
from DMOZ Open Directory Project4 and Yahoo’s directory5,
and malicious URLs from PhishTank and Spamscatter [2].
They reported a false positive rate (FPR) of 14.8% and a false
negative rate (FNR) of 8.9%.
Another popular approach is to analyze the structural prop-
erties of webpages, especially looking for known malicious
patterns within the embedded javascript, to identify malicious
sites that trigger drive-by-download attacks [11], [13], [16],
[21], [30]. JSAND by Cova et al. [11] combines anomaly
detection with emulation and uses a naive Bayes classifier.
Out of around 800 malicious pages and scripts, they report
a very low FNR of 0.2%, although they do not report the
corresponding FPR. Cujo [30] by Rieck et al. considers both
static and dynamic javaScript features and classifies websites
using Support Vector Machines (SVM). They look at around
220,000 benign websites and 600 drive-by-download attacks
and report an average true positives rate (TPR) of 94.4% with
a 0.002% FPR. They also ran JSAND on the same dataset and
report a 99.8% TPR. Finally, ZOZZLE by Curtsinger et al. [13]
considers over 1.2 million javascript samples and achieves FPR
and TPR in the range of 1.2-5.1%.
Closest to our work is Prophiler [9] by Canali et al., which
also looks at identifying malicious websites, but using only
static features related to the URL and the structure of a page.
For each web page they consider 37 URL-based, 20 HTML
and 26 JavaScript features and train three different classifiers,
one for each feature type. They reported 0.77% false negatives
and 9.88% false positives6 with a dataset of 15,000 web pages.
Below we summarize the main differences between our
work and previous research. While systems like Prophiler [9]
and JSAND [11] report good results for detecting malicious
websites, we consider a much broader and non-trivial problem
of predicting subjective rating dimensions like trustworthiness
and child-safety of a website. In addition, we consider not
4http://www.dmoz.org/ [Retrieved:May 15, 2018]
5http://random.yahoo.com/bin/ryl/ [Retrieved: May 15, 2018]
6Not to be confused with FNR or FPR; see Appendix D for exact definitions.
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Fig. 2. (a) WOT user interface showing aggregated user ratings of a web
page being poor (red) in both dimensions (trustworthiness and child safety).
The confidence in the rating is represented by the number of dark figurines.
(b) WOT divides the reputation rating range into five levels; The ratings of a
webpage are indicated by a color-coded glyph representing the level.
only the structure and URL of a web page but also the content
presented on that page. To our knowledge, this is the first study
combining static and content-based website features to predict
the future reputation rating of a website.
III. WEB REPUTATION SYSTEM WOT
WOT is a web reputation system, that provides reputation
ratings of the domain of a given URL in two dimensions,
trustworthiness and child safety, as an integer in the range
[0-100]. WOT builds the reputation ratings of a web domain
mainly based on crowdsourced input ratings from a large user
base and then applying a proprietary aggregation algorithm.
Additionally, WOT uses input from other trusted sources, but
the identities of these sources are not public.
The user front-end of WOT is a browser extension that
scans the page being rendered in the browser for URLs, looks
up their reputation ratings in the WOT backend, and shows the
results as color-coded glyphs. For example, Fig. 2(a) shows a
red glyph next to a website deemed unsafe by WOT. The rating
space is divided into five levels, with a color code assigned to
each level, see Fig. 2(b). Clicking on the glyph brings out a
pop-up window that shows more information about the rating.
WOT’s confidence in a rating (which we believe correlates
with the number of users who had given input ratings) is
also indicated in this window, represented by a set of dark
figurines (up to five). WOT has seen well over 100 million7
downloads. It is also used by large scale services like Facebook
and Mail.ru. It is reasonable to assume that the user base of
WOT and similar rating systems runs into tens of millions.
Our objective is to see if we can use information found on a
hitherto unrated webpage to predict what rating it will receive.
In this paper we use WOT as the target reputation system.
However, our proposed method is generic and would work
with any web reputation system. We therefore use existing
WOT ratings as the ground truth, and apply a supervised
learning-based algorithm for model learning. Moreover, instead
of building a regression model, we formulate the web page
reputation prediction as a binary classification task [4]. The
binary classification approach divides the reputation ratings
into two (coarse) groups by applying a suitable threshold on the
reputation ratings. This approach helps to minimize the effect
of subjective variations among users in their ratings. Given a
reputation rating r ∈ [0, 100] of a URL, the class information
of the URL is computed using the following simple rule:
7http://mywot.net [Retrieved: May 15, 2018].
Database 
Web-crawler 
  …
 
Web pages 
Reputation 
System 
WOT 
User ratings 
Features 
We
b p
age
 
rep
uta
tion
 
Unrated 
Web page 
Predictive  
Model Results 
LookAhead 
Fig. 3. An architectural overview of LookAhead in association with a
crowdsourced web reputation system WOT.
class(r) =
{
bad if r < Th
good otherwise
(1)
In our experiments (Section VI) we present results for Th =
40, while Appendix D contains results for Th = 60.
IV. LOOKAHEAD: PREDICTING SAFETY RATINGS
The main objective of LookAhead is to extend the existing
capabilities of a web reputation system, such as WOT, by
predicting the eventual ratings of previously unrated websites.
The predictive approach utilizes existing reputation ratings of
a large number of webpages to learn a mapping function from
various webpage features to a set of target classes, in our
case, either good or bad (see Equation 1). Fig. 3 illustrates
an overview of our web safety prediction approach combined
with WOT. The LookAhead part, highlighted in the figure, is
composed of a web crawler, a database, and a predictive model.
The web crawler extracts various features from webpages
and stores them, along with reputation ratings in various
dimensions8, to a database. The predictive model is responsible
for learning a classification model and also responsible for
predicting web safety of unrated URLs.
The efficacy of LookAhead relies mainly on the quality
of the learned predictive model, as well as its generalizability
to unforeseen URLs. As in any supervised machine learning
approach, precursor to the model learning is a time consum-
ing bootstrapping step [3]. A typical bootstrapping process
involves obtaining suitable feature representation of the data,
in our case websites, and collecting accurate ground truth
labels. Often the feature extraction process is referred to as
feature-engineering, as it relies on domain-specific expertise.
The optimal feature set is often dependent on the target classes
of interests and obtaining an optimal features set has been
identified as a non-trivial problem [22]. In this work we con-
sider two types of features to represent websites: (i) structural
features, which are extracted from the HTML and embedded
JavaScript codes, and (ii) content features that capture ratings
of web links embedded in the page and the thematic structure
of page text.
8Reputation ratings in trustworthiness and child safety are
obtained using API calls to the WOT system. For details see
https://www.mywot.com/wiki/API [Retrieved: May 15, 2018].
A. Structural Features of Web Pages
For structural features, we mainly rely on past research that
has identified and successfully validated a large set of features,
based on HTML and embedded JavaScripts codes, to identify
malicious webpages. Specifically, we adopt the handcrafted
and domain specific features proposed by Canali et al., as
part of their Prophiler system [9]. In the evaluation section
(see Section V-B), we consider Prophiler as our main baseline
algorithm.
1) HTML-based Features: We adopt the same 20 HTML
features9 used by Prophiler. Examples include the number
of iframe tags, the number of hidden elements, the number
of script elements, the percentage of unknown tags, and the
number of malicious patterns, e.g., presence of the meta
tag [9].
2) JavaScript-based Features: We use the same 24
JavaScript-based features used by Prophiler, which are ex-
tracted by analyzing either the JavaScript file or the <script>
element embedded within the HTML text. Examples of
JavaScript-based features include the number of times the
eval() function is used, the number of occurrence of the
setTimeout() and setInterval() functions, the number of DOM
modification functions, and the length of the script in charac-
ters (see [9]).
B. Content Features of Web Pages
Contrary to the state-of-the-art approaches, in this paper
we propose the use of a novel set of features based on
(1) empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of the
reputation ratings of embedded forward links and (2) topic
modeling. The main intuition behind using these features is
that by learning (unsupervised) webpage content properties,
we avoid the need for handcrafted features based on domain
knowledge. In our evaluation, we show that the proposed novel
features improve the recognition performance significantly (see
Section VI).
1) Embedded Link-based Features: To extract simple yet
effective clues about the content of a web page, we hypothesize
that the content of a page is related to the content of the pages
it links to. In other words, we make use of the hypothesis:
“You are the company you keep”. This saying is based on the
fact that often knowledge about a unknown person’s friends
provides some idea about the person’s interests or personality.
Similar ideas have been successfully applied in recommender
systems [7] and in detecting susceptibility of mobile devices
for malware infections [35].
Building on this idea, we propose a feature extraction
scheme utilizing the available reputation ratings of embedded
links. However, web pages may contain an arbitrary number
of embedded links, e.g., the number can vary between zero
and a very large number (few hundreds). Moreover, the range
of the reputation ratings can be arbitrary. Thus we need a
feature representation scheme that can compactly represent an
arbitrary number of outgoing links, while remaining robust in
the face of arbitrary ranges of ratings.
9Readers are referred to [9] for an exhaustive and in-depth description of
all the HTML features.
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Fig. 4. Overview of the embedded link-based feature extraction procedure.
For a given webpage (on the left), we identify the set of out going web
links (in the middle) present on the page and fetch the reputation ratings of
those embedded links. We use the reputation ratings to compute an empirical
cumulative distribution function (ECDF).
ECDF-based feature extraction has been previously ex-
plored in the field of ubiquitous computing and mobile sensing
to represent human motion characteristics from continuous ac-
celerometer data streams [3], [19], [28]. However, the method
has attracted very little attention outside the sensing domain.
The simplicity and fast computation time of the ECDF features
make it a viable option for using it in static web page analysis.
Contrary to mobile sensing, in this paper we primarily focus on
discrete reputation ratings. Fig. 4 shows a pictorial overview
of the basic idea of extracting ECDF-based features from a set
of embedded web links.
More formally, let R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} denotes the set of
available reputation ratings of all the embedded web links on
a page, where ri ∈ I[0,100], ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The ECDF Pc(r)
of R can be computed as below:
Pc(r) = p(X ≤ r), (2)
where, p(X = r) is the probability of observing an embedded
web link with a reputation rating of r and X is a random
variable that takes values from R (uniformly at random).
For example, Figure 5(a) shows an exemplary histogram of
reputation ratings of web links found within a web page and
Figure 5(b) shows the corresponding ECDF computed using
Equation 2. Note that Pc(r) is defined on the entire range
of the reputation ratings for embedded web links and is a
monotonically increasing function.
Often the distribution of reputation ratings for embedded
links is multimodal, e.g., as in our example shown in Fig-
ure 5(a). In order to learn from such distributions, a recognition
system should extract descriptors that relate to the shape and
spatial position of the modes [19]. The shape of the distribution
is captured as Pc increases from 0 to 1 (see Figure 5(b)). To
extract a feature vector f ∈ Rk from the distribution, we first
divide the range of Pc, i.e., [0, 1], into k equally sized bins
with centers respectively at [b1, b2, . . . , bk]. The ith feature
component fi ∈ R is then computed as:
fi = P−1c (bi) (3)
Thus the feature vector f accurately captures the shape and
positions from the underlying probability function p(r), while
the ECDF Pc can be computed efficiently using Kaplan-
Meier estimator [12]. For completeness, Figure 5(c) shows the
extracted ECDF-based feature vector for k = 75. The only
parameter for the ECDF-based feature extraction method is the
number of bins k, which controls the granularity with which
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(a) Histogram showing the frequency distribu-
tion of reputation ratings of embedded web links
found within a web page.
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(c) The ECDF-based features by computing the
inverse.
Fig. 5. Exemplary illustration of (a) the distribution of reputation ratings, (b) their Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function, and (c) ECDF-based features.
the shape of the underlying distribution is captured. In our
experiments we also append the mean of ratings in R as a
feature value to the extracted ECDF feature vector.
Adversarial Implications: If ECDF features were based on
all outgoing links, a malicious website may attempt to evade
detection by embedding a large number of links to pages with
high ratings. To deter such an attack, while constructing the set
R (see above), we only allow ratings r ≤ Cr, where Cr is the
critical rating threshold. The choice of Cr can be application
dependent and ideally should be adapted based on the overall
costs of making false negative predictions.
2) Topic Model-based Features: To gain further insight
into the type of content on a web page, we analyze the
text in the page and extract a set of features that captures
the distribution over a set of topics. A topic is defined as a
probability distribution over a fixed set of words. In order to
learn the topics in an unsupervised manner, we employ the well
established Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model [6]. The
main objective of LDA, or in general in any topic modeling
algorithm, is to extract short descriptions of documents, while
preserving statistical relationships that are useful, e.g., for
document summarization and classification. In this work, we
only focus on text in English. As a significant portion of the
webpages in our evaluation dataset (see Section V-A) is non-
english we use Google translation APIs, as part of the web
crawler, to convert text into english. To avoid translation errors,
we use an english dictionary to validate words before they are
included in the vocabulary set V used by the LDA model.
The main objective of the LDA model is to learn model
parameters, such as K topics β1:K , the topic proportions θd
in the document d, and topic assignments zn,d of observed
word wn in document d from the corpus of webpages. A
brief overview of the topic model and the definitions of the
parameters are given in Appendix A. Once the LDA parameters
are learned, given the set of words w present on a webpage
and the topics β1:K , the topic model-based feature set for the
webpage is computed as: p(θd|w, β1:K), i.e., the estimated
topic proportions.
Adversarial Implications: Similarly to the ECDF-based fea-
tures, the topic model-based features can be exploited by an
adversary. As the topic proportion term p(θd|w, β1:K) captures
the relative weight of various topics being described within the
text w, an attacker can simply add random words that can boost
the probability of certain topics. In Section VII we propose a
possible solution to prevent this attack.
C. Ensemble Classification
One challenge in the feature extraction procedures, de-
scribed above, is that often one or more feature types are
missing from a web page. For example, in reality, not all web
pages use JavaScript, contain embedded forward links, or use
textual descriptions, although the HTML features are always
available. Thus, a new classification technique is required that
is able to overcome the problem of feature unavailability.
Existing approaches such as [9], [23], [33], [34], do not address
this problem and therefore have limited generalizability.
According to Bayesian theory [20], given HTML (fH ),
JavaScript (fJ ), ECDF (fE), and Topic (fT ) feature vectors,
a URL should be assigned to the class cj ∈ {bad, good}, if
the posterior probability for class cj is maximum, i.e.
assign URL → cj if
p(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) = max
i
p(ci|fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) (4)
The computation of p(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) depends on the
joint probability functions (likelihood) p(fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT |cj)
and the prior probability p(cj), i.e.:
p(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) ∝ p(fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT |cj) p(cj) (5)
The likelihoods are difficult to infer when one or more features
are unavailable. The likelihood computation can be simpli-
fied by combining decision support of individual classifiers
on different feature types [20]. Accordingly, we train four
classifiers CH , CJ , CE , and CT using valid fH , fJ , fE , and fT
features respectively, where each classifiers returns a posterior
probability distribution over the bad and good classes. How-
ever during prediction, if a feature type is unavailable, we do
not include the corresponding classifier while computing the
overall posterior probabilities.
A number of strategies can be adopted to combine the
posterior probabilities of the classifiers to generate the overall
belief. In this paper we propose a linear combination rule that
determines the combination weights of individual classifiers
using the Fukunaga class separability score [18]. Our adaptive
weight selection method is based on the intuition that a clas-
sifier should be given more importance if it is easy to separate
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Fig. 6. Overview of the ensemble classification approach used by LookAhead.
among the bad and good classes in the corresponding feature
space. See Appendix B for definition of class separability used
in this work and other popular combination rules. For each
classifier, we compute the separability score after correlation
based feature subset selection. The separability scores, after
normalization, are then used as the respective weight wk for
the classifier Ck. The final belief of the class cj is estimated
as:
p∗(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) =
∑
k∈{H,J,E,T}
wk p(cj |fk) (6)
The final predicted class cj is inferred by applying the decision
rule given in Equation 4 using the computed belief above.
Fig. 6 shows the data adaptive ensemble classification tech-
nique used by LookAhead.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
A. Datasets
To perform an extensive and systematic study, we generated
a pool of over 140, 000 URLs and obtained their reputation
ratings in both dimensions using the WOT API. Out of these,
80, 000 URLs have positive reputation ratings, and 60, 000
URLs have negative ratings. For each URL we crawl the web
page to extract HTML, JavaScript, ECDF and topic model
features where available. Figure 7 illustrates the histograms of
reputation ratings for all webpages in our dataset. The dataset,
where at least valid HTML features and WOT ratings are avail-
able, is referred to as the opportunistic dataset. Out of 140, 000
URLs, 89, 220 web pages have trustworthiness ratings, and
84, 714 web pages have ratings for child safety. However, the
number drops to 31, 995, in case of trustworthiness, and to
38, 118 for child safety, when validity of all feature types are
considered (for T h = 40). We refer to this second dataset as
the all-valid dataset. The significant drop in the size of the
all-valid dataset further highlights that feature unavailability is
intrinsic to web data analysis.
Existing research primarily focussed on detecting if a
webpage is malicious. However, the malware dataset used
in [9] is no longer available, which makes exact replication
of Prophiler results difficult. The definition of trustworthiness
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Fig. 7. Histograms of all webpages in our dataset in two reputation
dimensions: trustworthiness (top) and child safety (bottom).
does not directly correspond with malware. In addition to the
reputation ratings, WOT provides category information, such
as ‘malware’, ‘scam’, ‘suspicious’ and ‘good site’, of websites
based on votes from users and third parties. We filter the all-
valid dataset and generate a malware dataset consisting of
2, 784 webpages that were categorized by WOT as ‘malware
or virus’ and contain all feature types. To generate a dataset
containing both malware and benign webpages, we include an
equal number of webpages that got very high trustworthiness
ratings and have all feature types. We refer to this dataset as
the malware dataset.
Lastly, we construct another dataset by considering only
the URLs that fall either in the top most or the bottom most
trustworthiness rating categories, see Figure 2(b) for definitions
of various rating categories used by WOT. As with malware
dataset, we only consider webpages for which all feature types
are available. Our two-category dataset consists of 10, 118 very
poor and 13, 539 excellent webpages.
B. Baseline Algorithms
In our experiments, we report comparison results against
Prophier [9]. Prophiler relies on HTML, JavaScript, and
URL/HOST features to detect if a webpage is malicious. How-
ever, it uses APIs to a proprietary WHOIS [15] system and uses
a private database for blacklisted URLs to extract URL/HOST
features. Neither of these are available openly, which makes
the corresponding URL/HOST feature vectors invalid for our
datasets. Consequently, we do not use URL/HOST features in
our ensemble classification system.
Note that it is very easy to incorporate additional feature
types to our classification system, e.g., training a classifier C
using the new feature type and then considering the posterior
probabilities in Equation 14. Contrary to our approach, i.e.,
assigning data driven weighting of classifiers to compute the
final belief (see Section IV-C), Prophiler uses the ‘OR’ combi-
nation rule (see Appendix C). We systematically compare the
performance of LookAhead with the ensemble classification
methodology considering different subsets of feature types.
C. Evaluation Metric
We use 10-fold cross validations when presenting classi-
fication performance for all the approaches. As the primary
performance metric, we use Avg. F1-score, FNR, and FPR.
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE OF LOOKAHEAD (UNDER
VARIOUS FEATURE COMBINATIONS) AND PROPHILER
ON THE ALL-VALID DATASET.
All-valid dataset size: 31,995 URLs, T h = 40, Cr = 40
Reputation dimension: Trustworthiness
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X 75.6 ** 25.2 23.7
X 74.3 ** 25.6 25.9
X 66.9 ** 33.5 32.7
X 74.5 ** 26.8 24.3
X X 76.9 ** 23.3 22.8
X X 77.3 ** 23.7 21.7
X X 78.5 ** 21.8 21.3
X X 72.1 ** 28.9 26.9
X X 77.1 ** 24.0 21.9
X X 77.5 ** 23.9 21.2
X X X 78.8 ** 21.6 20.7
X X X 79.5 ** 20.9 20.1
X X X 80.4 ** 20.2 19.0
X X X 79.6 ** 21.4 19.4
X X X X 81.3 19.0 18.3
Prophiler 74.5 ** 14.2 35.9
All-valid dataset size: 38,118 URLs, T h = 40, Cr = 40
Reputation dimension: Child safety
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X 80.3 ** 15.2 25.8
X 79.6 ** 15.8 26.8
X 73.1 ** 22.0 33.6
X 81.9 ** 17.0 19.8
X X 81.1 ** 14.3 25.1
X X 79.4 ** 16.3 26.3
X X 84.5 ** 13.4 18.3
X X 77.3 ** 18.1 29.1
X X 83.9 ** 14.6 18.2
X X 83.9 ** 14.9 17.7
X X X 82.4 ** 13.5 23.2
X X X 85.2 ** 12.2 18.4
X X X 85.7 ** 12.6 16.7
X X X 85.3 ** 13.4 16.6
X X X X 86.4 11.6 16.2
Prophiler 79.5 ** 9.6 34.5
**: Statistically significant with 99% confidence.
The definitions of all the evaluation metrics are given in
Appendix D.
VI. EVALUATION
We begin our evaluation by first considering classification
performance on the all-valid dataset using Random Forest as
the basic classifier10. Note that, all URLs considered within
this dataset have valid HTML (H), JavaScript (J), ECDF (E)
and Topic-based (T) features. This dataset allows us to system-
atically study the influence of various feature combinations on
the overall classification performance of LookAhead. Table I
summarizes the performance of LookAhead in both reputation
dimensions with the parametric settings T h = 40 (see Equa-
tion 1), and Cr = 40 (see Section IV-B). Additionally, the
table also includes the performance of Prophiler.
For trustworthiness, LookAhead achieves the highest Avg.
F1-score of 81.3%, when all feature types are considered
(highlighted in gray), at the same time achieving the lowest
FNR (19%) and FPR (18.3%). Similarly for child safety,
LookAhead with all feature types achieves the best perfor-
mance (86.4%), lowest FNR (11.6%) and lowest FPR (16.2%).
10We also experimented using linear-SVM, SVM, KNN and C4.5 classifiers,
and chose Random Forest for its superior performance.
TABLE II. PERFORMANCE OF LOOKAHEAD ON THE
OPPORTUNISTIC DATASET UNDER VARIOUS CLASSIFIER
COMBINATION RULES.
Opportunistic dataset size: 89,220 URLs, T h = 40 and Cr = 40
Reputation dimension: Trustworthiness
Experiment Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
Comb. Rule Balancing (%) (%) (%)
Adaptive 78.0 56.4 4.1
Sum 77.8 57.9 3.5
Product 78.9 ** 53.3 4.6
Or 32.4 ** 10.1 84.2
Voting 71.4 ** 38.8 25.2
Prophiler* 72.6 ** 45.3 19.8
Adaptive X 74.0 22.3 29.1
Sum X 74.0 22.3 29.0
Product X 73.6 ** 22.8 29.5
Or X 27.3 ** 2.3 89.8
Voting X 57.3 ** 11.1 57.0
Prophiler* X 62.0 ** 14.4 49.8
Opportunistic dataset size: 84,714 URLs, T h = 40 and Cr = 40
Reputation dimension: Child safety
Experiment Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
Comb. Rule Balancing (%) (%) (%)
Adaptive 83.7 29.8 7.2
Sum 83.4 * 31.2 6.6
Product 83.6 29.6 7.5
Or 40.7 ** 4.7 82.3
Voting 73.9 ** 19.7 30.7
Prophiler* 73.9 ** 26.7 26.2
Adaptive X 81.5 25.3 14.0
Sum X 81.1 ** 22.9 16.4
Product X 80.9 ** 23.1 16.8
Or X 40.0 ** 3.0 83.4
Voting X 68.1 ** 12.3 44.3
Prophiler* X 69.4 ** 15.6 40.5
**: Statistically significant with 99% confidence.
* : Statistically significant with 95% confidence.
In both reputation dimensions, the performance using all
features, is significantly better (statistically) than all other
feature combinations, i.e., p 0.01 in McNemar χ2 test with
Yates’ correction [24].
Prophiler shows a statistically weaker classification perfor-
mance in both reputation dimensions compared to LookAhead
(employing all feature types). However, it achieves a better
FNR in prediction than LookAhead. This is due to the use
of a conservative ‘OR’ classifier combination rule (see Ap-
pendix C) that is more likely to report a URL as bad. This
higher likelihood of predicting webpages as bad improves
the overall recall of the bad class, which consequently pulls
down the FNR for Prophiler, however, at the expense of a
higher FPR. Prophiler focuses solely on reducing FNR. In
contrast, in use cases where overall usability in prediction is
important, both FNR and FPR should be reduced. For example,
in predicting safety ratings, a low FPR is also needed to avoid
showing frequent warnings to users for actually good websites.
A very similar classification performance (Table VI in the
Appendix) is observed when the same set of experiments are
conducted on the all-valid dataset for T h = 60, and Cr = 60.
In reality, not all feature types are available for all URLs.
To evaluate the performance of LookAhead under real life
situations we next present results on the opportunistic dataset.
In these experiments, we only present the performance of
LookAhead while considering all available feature types.
Moreover, we study the performance of various classifier
combination rules and present the results in Table II for both
reputation dimensions. In contrast to the all-valid dataset,
T h = 40, generates a high degree of class imbalance in
TABLE III. PERFORMANCE OF LOOKAHEAD AND
PROPHILER ON THE MALWARE AND TWO-CATEGORY
DATASETS.
Malware dataset size: 5,568 URLs
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X X X X 89.0 10.3 11.6
Prophiler 80.7 ** 11.1 27.3
Tow-category dataset size: 23,657 URLs
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X X X X 89.8 13.9 7.4
Prophiler 79.3 ** 16.2 24.3
**: Statistically significant with 99% confidence.
our opportunistic dataset (see Figure 7). During the training
phase the prevalence of one class affects the process of
learning, and the learned classifier is often biased towards
the over-represented class [25]. To mitigate class imbalances
during training, we also report experimental results when a
simple class balancing approach, i.e., reducing data from the
prevalent class, is applied during classifier training. The data
driven, adaptive classification combination rule of LookAhead
generates the best classification performance, with a notable
exception in the case of unbalanced dataset for trustworthiness,
where the ‘Product’ rule achieves the highest Avg. F1-Score.
Prophiler has previously been shown to perform well in
detecting malicious websites. To show how LookAhead (with
all features) perform in such scenarios, we repeated the exper-
iments on the malware and two-category datasets and present
the results in Table III. LookAhead achieves average F1-scores
of 89% for the malware dataset and 89.8% for the two-
category dataset, which are significantly better (p 0.01) than
Prophiler’s performance of 80.7% for the malware dataset and
79.3% for the two-category dataset. LookAhead also generates
better FNR and FPR than Prophiler in both cases.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Feature Importance in Reputation Prediction
Our results show that the structural and content related
properties of a website can be effectively used to predict not
only its maliciousness, but also the more challenging properties
of trustworthiness and child safety. In order to understand
the overall classification results, we study the importance11 of
individual features as computed by a Random Forest classifier.
In Fig. 8 we plot the average12 importance for all (120) features
used in this work when training a Random Forest classifier
(using 100 trees) on the all-valid dataset (T h = 40, Cr = 40).
The higher the value, the more important is the feature. Fig. 8
further highlights that different features are assigned different
relative importances while separating good websites from bad
ones in each reputation dimension.
Interestingly, the importance scores of the HTML and
JavaScript-based features look very similar for both trust-
worthiness and child safety predictions. The most important
features, shown by the dotted region A in the figure, are related
11Feature importance is defined as the total decrease in node impurity
averaged over all the trees [8].
12Over 10 folds.
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Fig. 8. Importance of individual features, while predicting trustworthiness
and child safety, computed by the Random Forest classifier on the all-valid
dataset.
to script tags in HTML, direct assignments in JavaScript, and
the total character count in both. Although a few structural (i.e.,
HTML and JavaScript) features are found to be important, a
majority of them have little or no significance. Contrary to the
structural features, ECDF features show significant differences
in importance scores for the two reputation dimensions. For
trustworthiness, low ratings of the embedded forward links
(region B) play an important role in prediction. In child safety,
the mean value of the embedded ratings (region C) plays
a significant role also. For trustworthiness, the three most
important topics (region E) are related to money-making, news,
and weather. Among the rest of the topic features, none are
significantly better or worse than the others. For child safety
prediction there are three other topics (region D) that play a
significant role and as expected, these topics correspond to
adult content.
Although, we use the same feature set for predicting
both reputation dimensions, the feature selection inherent to
the Random Forest classifier learns very different mapping
functions for each prediction task. Fig. 8 provides evidence
that our proposed ECDF and Topic-based features contribute
consistently in predicting subjective ratings of web pages.
B. Tuning of Prediction Performance
Predictive performance of LookAhead can be primarily
influenced by a number of factors: (i) the type of features con-
sidered (e.g., HTML and ECDF), (ii) the type of classifier used
to train on individual feature dimensions (e.g., Random Forest
and SVM), (iii) strategies used to overcome class imbalances
in the training data, and (iv) the combination rule used for
computing the final posterior probability (e.g., Adaptive and
Sum rule). Often, once the prediction pipeline is deployed, the
factors (i)–(iii) are kept constant, as they are time consuming
to re-build. However, the classifier combination strategy can be
adapted in real time to control the overall performance of the
LookAhead system. Based on the requirements, the system
administrator can focus more on lowering the overall FNR
by using the ‘OR’ combination rule, e.g., while predicting
child safety a very low FNR is expected for parental filtering
systems. As evident from Table II, often emphasizing FNR
TABLE IV. DETECTION RATES FOR VARIOUS CLASSIFIERS SETTINGS.
Dataset System FNR FPR Dr
(%) (%) (%)
All-valid, TW LookAhead 19.0 18.3 52.5
All-valid, TW Prophiler 14.2 35.9 37.4
All-valid, CS LookAhead 11.6 16.2 57.5
All-valid, CS Prophiler 9.6 34.5 39.6
Opportunistic, TW LookAhead 22.3 29.1 40.0
Opportunistic, TW Prophiler 14.4 49.8 30.1
Opportunistic, CS LookAhead 25.3 14.0 57.2
Opportunistic, CS Prophiler 15.6 40.5 34.3
inflates FPR. Our LookAhead system demonstrates a good
balance of both FNR and FPR.
C. Detection Rate
When considering the implications of our results, in ad-
dition to the FNR and FPR, the proportion of good and bad
websites in the wild should also be taken into account. In
reality, this so-called base rate Br, is biased towards good
websites. Thus we look at the detection rate for bad websites,
i.e., what percentage of webpages that our classifier predicts
as bad are truly bad. From WOT statistics [31], we see that
roughly 20% of websites that have a rating are dangerous
regarding either trustworthiness or child safety. We use this
number as our estimate for Br, and compute the detection
rate as:
Dr = (1− FNR) ·Br
(1− FNR) ·Br + FPR · (1−Br) , (7)
Table V presents detection rates for our different classi-
fication scenarios. The datasets are presented for both trust-
worthiness (TW) and child safety (CS). We can see that
due to the biased base rate, the detection rates are in the
range of 30-40% for Prophiler and 40-57% for LookAhead.
Still, the better classification performance of LookAhead over
Prophiler is apparent here too. For example, if we consider
a warning system for users, we can see that, in the case of
all features being present, 52.5% of possible warnings for
untrustworthy webpages would be correct for LookAhead,
with the rest being false alarms. The corresponding detection
rate of 37.4% for Prophiler is significantly lower. This shows
that while in general the problem of predicting a reputation
rating is challenging due in part to the biased base rate,
considering content-based features significantly increases the
detection rate.
D. Applications
We see two potential uses for LookAhead:
• fast-tracking publication of ratings: Crowdsourced
reputation rating services like WOT do not announce
a rating for a web site until they have enough input
ratings to reach a sufficient level of confidence. If
a partially accumulated rating (that has not reached
a sufficient level of confidence) matches the rating
predicted by our classifier, the reputation service may
choose to fast-track the publication of the rating.
• intermediate user feedback: If a user attempts to
navigate to an unrated page that is predicted by our
classifier to have a potentially bad rating, the browser
extension can warn the user accordingly.
TABLE V. TIME ANALYSIS FOR FETCHING VARIOUS FEATURES.
Feature type Average fetch time
HTML + JavaScript 3.1 s / link
ECDF 1.9 s / link
Topic + translation 3.4 s / link
Topic + without translation 1.3 s / link
Earlier research [26] raised concerns about the usefulness of
crowdsourcing for security and privacy applications. Neverthe-
less, given the popularity of systems like WOT, we argue that
a tool like LookAhead is essential for the security of users
who have chosen to rely on such systems. Also, note that
although our analysis was done with WOT as the target rating
system, the methodology is applicable to any website safety
rating system, whether crowdsourced or expert-rated.
E. Performance considerations
We summarize the performance of our various feature
extraction techniques and report the average measured running
time needed for computing them. For the purpose of computing
the average extraction time we randomly selected 1, 000 URLs
from our dataset and measured the time required to extract
different classes of features on a standard Linux desktop
computer (8 Gb RAM, 2.4 GHz processor) for the corre-
sponding pages. In the case of Topic model features we also
recorded the time for performing translation of non-english
web pages. Table V summarizes the time analysis of our
feature extraction methods. The time of 3.1 s that LookAhead
needs for extracting structural features is comparable to that of
3.06 s reported by Prophiler. When including the content based
features, in total, LookAhead needs 6.3 s to extract all features
from an English-language web page (and 8.4 s if translation
is needed).
F. Limitations
Perhaps the most significant limitation of any system using
machine learning to detect bad websites is the potential for
adversaries to manipulate the system: either by modifying their
website to avoid detection or by manipulating the classifier
itself. While the use of the ECDF-function protects against
manipulation of outgoing links, as we pointed out in Sec-
tion IV-B2, the simplistic approach of using topic modeling is
vulnerable to an attacker who attempts to influence the inferred
topic model for a page he controls. Instead of directly using the
probability distribution of topics as we do in Section IV-B2,
we could convert to a boolean vector (indicating if the topic is
present on the page). Such an approach will reduce FN (since
an attacker can no longer gain by adding text to his page to
make it appear to belong to an innocuous topic as the dominant
topic), but will also raise FPs. We are currently investigating
this avenue.
Another limitation is that, although the performance of
LookAhead is comparable to previous solutions, real time use
will require further speedup. One option here is to use server-
side assisted feature extraction. Finally, an open question is
how the use of predicted ratings will influence the actual rating.
For example, if the predicted rating is used for intermediate
user feedback as suggested above, it might sway future input
ratings from the crowd towards the predicted rating.
G. Current Work
We are conducting a longitudinal study on a large number
of websites that do not yet have a WOT rating. We plan to
see (a) how well our predictions match those websites that do
eventually get a rating and (b) how do our predictions as well
as the actual ratings evolve over time.
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APPENDIX
A. Topic Modeling
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Fig. 9. Graphical model representing the LDA used to analyze text form
web pages. The boxes represent replications, the shaded circle is the observed
variable (word) and unshaded circles are unobserved variables.
A graphical representation of the model that we use in our
analysis of web texts is shown in Figure 9. LDA follows a
probabilistic generative modeling approach using the bag-of-
words assumption, i.e., the order of occurrence of words within
a document is ignored. Under the LDA model, each web page
or document d ∈ D is represented as a mixture of k latent
(unobserved) topics denoted by the multinomial variable θd
(topic proportion of the dth document), where each topic βk
is a distribution over the set of words or vocabularies V and
is sampled from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter η. θd
is also drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α.
zn,d denotes the topic-assignment for the observed word wn,d,
which is sampled from θd. Each word wn,d depends on the
topic-assignment variable zn,d and all the topic distributions
{βk}Kk=1. The joint probability distribution can be written
as [5]:
p(β1:K , θ1:D, z1:D, w1:D) =
K∏
k=1
p(βk|η)
D∏
d=1
p(θd|α)(
N∏
n=1
p(zn,d|θd)p(wn,d|zn,d, β1:K)
)
(8)
The main task of the topic model is thus to infer the
parameters βk, θd and zn,d from the corpus of text, i.e., w1:D.
The posterior distribution can be written as:
p(β1:K , θ1:D, z1:D|w1:D) = p(β1:K , θ1:D, z1:D, w1:D)
p(w1:D)
(9)
Although, there are variational algorithms proposed in the
literature for estimating the posterior distribution given in
Equation 9, we use a Gibbs sampling-based approach to
efficiently approximate it. Once the model parameters are
estimated, for a given web page or document d containing
the set of words13 w, we use p(θd|w, β1:K), i.e., the estimated
topic proportion as the feature set for capturing the thematic
content of the document.
With topic modeling we gain insights into the basic
composition of the web content present in our opportunistic
dataset. The most frequent topics encountered were related to
commenting and sharing, adult content, financial topics, and
gaming. The most frequently occurring words are visualized
in Fig. 10, which is created using the online tool Voyant [36].
In the figure the size of individual words reflects its relative
number of occurrences in our sample set of web pages.
13As a common pre-processing step, we remove all frequently occurring
words or stop words (in the language) from a document.
Fig. 10. Textual summary of the most frequent words present in our
opportunistic dataset, where the size indicated the frequency of the words
in the web text.
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Fig. 11. Average classifier combination weights used by LookAhead on the
all-valid dataset.
B. Fukunaka Class Separability
The Fukunaga score relies on computing both the within-
class and between-class scatter matrices. Let ni be the number
of samples of the feature set belonging to class ci of C different
classes. Further, let µi and µ respectively be the mean for class
ci and the global mean. The within-class and between-class
scatter matrices SW and SB can be computed as follows:
SW =
C∑
i=1
 ni∑
j=1
(fi,j − µi)(fi,j − µi)T
 (10)
SB =
C∑
i=1
ni(µi − µ)(µi − µ)T (11)
Then the Fukunaga class separability score is computed as:
Separability = Tr(SB/SW ) (12)
To illustrate the effect of classification combination strategy,
Fig. 11 shows the average (computed over 10 folds) relative
weights, computed using Fukunaga class separability, as used
by LookAhead for the all-valid dataset.
C. Classifier Combination Rules
1) Sum Rule:
p∗(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) =
∑
k∈{H,J,E,T}
p(cj |fk) (13)
2) Product Rule:
p∗(cj |fH ,fJ ,fE ,fT ) =
∏
k∈{H,J,E,T}
p(cj |fk) (14)
3) OR Rule: If at least one of the constituent classifiers
predicts a URL to be bad, then the overall prediction is bad.
TABLE VI. PERFORMANCE OF LOOKAHEAD,
UNDER VARIOUS FEATURE COMBINATIONS, AND
PROPHILER ON THE ALL-VALID DATASET.
All-valid dataset size: 43,675 URLs, T h = 60, Cr = 60
Reputation dimension: Trustworthiness
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X 75.7 ** 23.6 24.9
X 74.9 ** 25.1 25.1
X 70.5 ** 29.0 29.9
X 74.9 ** 24.5 25.6
X X 76.8 ** 22.6 23.8
X X 77.2 ** 24.0 21.6
X X 78.7 ** 20.1 22.3
X X 74.1 ** 26.4 25.5
X X 77.8 ** 21.7 22.7
X X 79.1 ** 21.1 20.6
X X X 79.2 ** 21.7 19.8
X X X 79.6 ** 19.5 21.2
X X X 81.7 ** 18.0 18.7
X X X 80.9 ** 19.1 19.1
X X X X 82.4 17.3 17.9
Prophiler 75.3 ** 15.0 33.7
All-valid dataset size: 42,334 URLs, T h = 60, Cr = 60
Reputation dimension: Child safety
Feature sets Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
H J E T (%) (%) (%)
X 79.2 ** 16.7 26.4
X 78.7 ** 16.5 27.9
X 73.4 ** 22.4 32.4
X 80.9 ** 17.9 20.8
X X 79.9 ** 15.7 26.0
X X 79.0 ** 17.4 25.8
X X 83.2 ** 14.7 19.7
X X 76.8 ** 19.4 28.5
X X 82.8 ** 15.6 19.6
X X 83.1 ** 15.8 18.6
X X X 81.4 ** 14.8 23.6
X X X 84.0 ** 13.4 19.6
X X X 84.8 ** 13.5 17.5
X X X 84.3 ** 14.3 17.8
X X X X 85.3 12.8 17.4
Prophiler 78.4 ** 10.5 35.8
**: Statistically significant with 99% confidence.
4) Majority Voting: The final classification is based on the
majority voting of the constituent classifiers. Ties are broken
randomly.
D. Evaluation Metrics
In our experimental evaluations we use F1-score (expressed
as a percentage) as the main performance indicator, which is
computed as:
F1-score =
2 · precision · recall
precision + recall
, where (15)
precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (16)
and recall =
TP
TP + FN
. (17)
Here, TP = True positives, FP = False positives, and FN =
False negatives.
In line with standard practices [3], [32], to overcome
non-uniform class distribution in the test dataset, we use the
weighted average of the individual F1-score of all classes.
Avg. F1-score =
∑c
i=1 wi · F i1-score∑c
i=1 wi
, (18)
TABLE VII. PERFORMANCE OF LOOKAHEAD ON THE
OPPORTUNISTIC DATASET.
Opportunistic dataset size: 89,220 URLs, T h = 60 and Cr = 60
Reputation dimension: Trustworthiness
Experiment Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
Comb. Rule Balancing (%) (%) (%)
Adaptive 80.3 33.9 10.5
Sum 79.6 * 38.0 8.7
Product 80.0 * 36.0 9.6
Or 44.3 ** 5.0 77.6
Voting 71.4 ** 23.6 32.4
Prophiler* 71.7 ** 30.5 27.5
Adaptive X 77.1 20.0 25.2
Sum X 77.0 19.4 25.7
Product X 76.6 ** 20.0 26.1
Or X 40.5 ** 1.9 82.4
Voting X 64.2 ** 10.5 50.3
Prophiler* X 65.8 ** 14.6 46.2
Opportunistic dataset size: 84,714 URLs, T h = 60 and Cr = 60
Reputation dimension: Child safety
Experiment Avg. F1-Score FNR FPR
Comb. Rule Balancing (%) (%) (%)
Adaptive 82.6 26.8 10.0
Sum 82.4 * 28.7 8.9
Product 82.3 * 27.4 10.1
Or 45.4 ** 4.4 80.0
Voting 73.0 ** 17.7 34.0
Prophiler* 72.5 ** 23.9 30.4
Adaptive X 80.8 25.9 14.1
Sum X 80.6 * 23.6 16.3
Product X 80.3 ** 23.7 16.7
Or X 45.3 ** 3.6 80.3
Voting X 69.3 ** 13.0 43.3
Prophiler* X 69.7 ** 16.0 40.7
**: Statistically significant with 99% confidence.
* : Statistically significant with 95% confidence.
where, F i1-score is the F1-score of the i
th class and wi is the
number of samples of class i in the test dataset. Additionally,
we report the FNR and FPR, computed from the confusion
matrix as:
FNR =
FN
FN + TP
, FPR =
FP
FP + TP
, (19)
E. Results
Similarly to the Section VI, for completeness, we present
performance of LookAhead and Prophiler on the all-valid
dataset for T h = 60, Cr = 60 in Table VI. Note that, a
higher value of Cr allows more URLs to have valid ECDF
features and thus increases the dataset sizes in both dimen-
sions compared to the results presented in Table I. Table VII
presents the performance of LookAhead and Prophiler on the
opportunistic dataset with T h = 60, Cr = 60, while using
various classifier combination rules.
